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Abstract
Intangible assets, like patents and trademarks, are increasingly seen as the
key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profit. Moreover,
they constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities in multinational
enterprises (MNEs) due to a highly intransparent transfer pricing process. This
paper argues that for both reasons, MNEs have an incentive to locate intangible
property at affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate. Using panel data
on European MNEs and controlling for unobserved time–constant heterogeneity
between affiliates, we find that the lower a subsidiary’s tax rate relative to
other affiliates of the multinational group the higher is its level of intangible
asset investment. This effect is statistically and economically significant, even
after controlling for subsidiary size and accounting for a dynamic intangible
investment pattern.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, intangible assets have gained increasing importance in the corporate
production process (e.g. Hall, 2001). Since access to financial capital has been sub-
stantially improved, key physical assets are less scarce (Zingales, 2000) and intangible
factors related to product innovation and marketing are increasingly seen as the key
to competitive success (Edmans, 2007). Hence, intangibles like patents, trademarks,
customer lists and copyrights have become major determinants of firm value. This de-
velopment is especially significant in multinational enterprises (MNEs).1 While until
the early 1990ies, MNEs commonly raised little or no fee from their corporate affili-
ates for the use of patents or trademarks, owners of these intangibles have – in line
with updated legal regulations and accounting standards – started to charge for their
immaterial goods and, thus, intangibles–related intra–firm trade has surged.
Since then, an increasing number of anecdotes has reported that MNEs transfer
their valuable intangible property to low–tax jurisdictions. Famous examples are Pfizer,
Bristol–Myers Squibb and Microsoft which have relocated a considerable part of their
research and development (R&D) units and patents from their home countries to Ire-
land (see e.g. Simpson, 2005, on Microsoft’s R&D transfer). Others founded trademark
holding companies in tax havens that own and administer the group’s brands and li-
censes. E.g. Vodafone’s intangible properties are held by an Irish subsidiary, and Shell’s
central brand management is located at a Swiss affiliate from where it charges royalties
to operating subsidiaries worldwide. Moreover, an increasing number of financial con-
sultancies advocates multinational tax planning strategies that imply the relocation of
intangible property to low–tax affiliates.2
Governments and tax authorities have raised increasing concerns about these reloca-
tion examples (Hejazi, 2006). They fear that the trend to fragment corporate production
by locating value–driving intangible intermediate goods in low–tax economies dimin-
ishes the multinational corporate tax base in their countries. Moreover, arm’s length
1Empirical evidence links the presence of intangible property to the emergence of MNEs. Intangibles
are perceived to foster FDI since they ”can be easily transferred back and forth and [...] enjoy a public
good nature which makes them available to additional production facilities at relatively low costs”
(Markusen, 1995; Gattai, 2005).
2Examples are the British brand valuation consultancy Brand Finance plc whose client list includes
world–wide operating MNEs like British American Tabacco, Danone, Shell or Foster’s (Brand Finance
plc, 2008) and the renowned US law firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Morgan Lewis & Bockius
LLP, 2007).
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prices for firm–specific intangibles are hard to determine (see e.g. Grubert, 2003; Desai
et al., 2006), which gives rise to the additional concern that MNEs may shift profits
earned at production affiliates in high–tax countries to the intangibles–holding low–tax
affiliate by overstating the true transfer price for royalties and license fees.
Surprisingly though, it has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been clarified
within an empirical framework whether these relocation examples are individual cases
or represent a systematic multinational investment pattern. We investigate this ques-
tion using panel data on European MNEs and find evidence for a statistically significant
and quantitatively relevant bias of intangible property holdings towards affiliates with
a low corporate tax rate relative to other group locations.
To receive guidance for the specification of our estimation model, the paper starts
out with a short section on theoretical considerations. We argue that MNEs have an
incentive to relocate intangible property to low–tax countries for two reasons. First,
intangible property is increasingly perceived to be the driver of (multinational) firm
profit. As immaterial goods may easily be locally separated from other production units
in the group, the MNE has an incentive to locate them at low–tax countries in order to
tax the accruing rents at a small rate. Second, MNEs may have an incentive to locate
their intangible property at a low–tax affiliate for profit shifting reasons. Conditional on
the assumption that intra–firm trade of intellectual property rights establishes increased
transfer pricing opportunities between the intangibles owner and the group’s production
affiliates, it pays to locate intangibles at a low–tax affiliate since this generates profit
shifting channels between the intangibles–holding tax haven and all other affiliates
located in countries with a higher corporate tax rate. In contrast, intangibles location
at one of the group’s high–tax affiliates generates shifting possibilities solely between
the tax haven and the intangibles–holding firm whereas other high–tax affiliates remain
without shifting link to a low–tax country. The paper argues that for both reasons,
the location of intangible property becomes more attractive the lower the subsidiary’s
corporate tax rate relative to other group locations.
The empirical section employs a large panel data set of multinational affiliates within
the EU–25 which is available for the years 1995 to 2005. Our data is drawn from the
micro database AMADEUS that provides detailed accounting information at the affil-
iate level and allows identification of a multinational group’s ownership structure. Fol-
lowing our theoretical considerations, we determine the effect of an affiliate’s average
statutory corporate tax rate difference to other group members on its level of intangi-
ble asset investment. Controlling for unobserved time–constant heterogeneity between
subsidiaries, year effects, country characteristics and affiliate size, the results confirm
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our expectations and point to a robust inverse relation between the subsidiary’s statu-
tory tax rate relative to other group affiliates and its intangibles holdings. The effect
is statistically and economically significant and appears across a range of specification
and estimation choices that address endogeneity issues and the dynamic nature of the
intangible asset investment. Quantitatively, the estimations suggest a semi–elasticity
of around 1.1, meaning that a decrease in the average tax differential to other group
affiliates by 10 percentage points raises a subsidiary’s intangible property investment
by around 11% on average.
The paper adds to the literature on corporate taxation and multinational firm be-
havior. In the last years, research in this area has largely focused on the investigation
of profit shifting activities. Various papers show that affiliate pre–tax profitability (i.e.
profits per input factor or sales) is inversely related to the statutory corporate tax
rate and the tax rate differential to other group members, respectively (see Huizinga
and Laeven, 2008, for a recent paper). These results are usually interpreted as indirect
evidence for profit shifting activities through the distortion of multinational transfer
prices and/or the group’s equity dept structure. Our paper suggests that this prof-
itability pattern may be established by a third mechanism which is the relocation of
profit–driving intangible property to low–tax affiliates. Although these relocations may
also be induced by the desire to optimize transfer pricing opportunities (as described
above), the relocation of value–driving assets itself generates the respective profitability
pattern even in the absence of shifting activities.
Our paper moreover relates to existing work that connects the presence of intangible
property holdings to multinational profit shifting behavior arguing that the true price
for firm–specific intangible property is hard to control for national tax authorities and
henceforth multinationals could easily engage in transfer pricing manipulations (e.g.
Grubert, 2003). Moreover, there is some evidence that MNEs adjust their organiza-
tion and investment structure to optimize profit shifting opportunities. For example,
Grubert and Slemrod (1998) and Desai et al. (2006) find that parent firms with high
intangible asset investments and henceforth good opportunities to engage in profit
shifting activities are most likely to invest in tax havens. Analogously, Grubert (2003)
shows that R&D intensive MNEs engage in significantly larger volumes of intra–group
transactions and thus create more opportunities for income shifting. However, none
of these papers considers the location of intangible property within the multinational
group to be a choice variable of the MNE. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to show in a systematic econometric approach that MNEs distort the location of
their value–driving and shifting–relevant intangibles towards low–tax affiliates in the
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multinational group. The only exception we are aware of is a recent paper by Grubert
and Mutti (2007) who point out that US parents’ R&D investment has become a weak
predictor for royalty payments from foreign subsidiaries to the US parent but simulta-
neously strongly enlarges the earnings of group affiliates located in tax havens. They
interpret their results to reflect the parents’ incentive to found hybrid entities in tax
havens and to reach favorable cost sharing agreements on R&D investment with them.
The hybrids then sell patent licenses to high–tax production affiliates and receive the
corresponding royalty payments as earnings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a short mo-
tivation of the hypothesis tested in our empirical model. In Section 3, we describe our
data and the sample construction. Section 4 states the basic estimation methodology.
The estimation results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A Rationale for Intangible Asset Location at
Low–tax Countries
Our paper’s purpose is to empirically investigate whether corporate taxation distorts
the location of intangible assets within a corporate group as suggested by growing
anecdotic evidence.3 For a better understanding, we will in the following shortly sketch
potential rationales behind the (re)location of intangible property at (to) low–tax coun-
tries. We will thereby refer to two motives. Firstly, it pays for MNEs to locate highly
profitable intangible assets at tax havens and, secondly, intangibles location at a low–
tax county may optimize the multinational profit shifting strategy.
In general, it is widely acknowledged that a large fraction of MNEs in industrialized
economies is horizontally organized with production locations in several countries (e.g.
Markusen, 2002). The manufacturing of the final output good thereby often requires
a set of intangible inputs (e.g. patents, trademarks or management services). In the
last years, these intangible assets have been increasingly perceived to be the major de-
terminants of firm value while the actual output production only generates relatively
low profit margins. A classic example are producers of pharmaceutical articles which
earn their profit by developing innovative patents and promote brand names on the
3We follow the notion that there is an optimal location pattern for intangible assets across group
affiliates in the absence of corporate taxation, i.e. some affiliates are more efficient in developing and
administering intangible property than others (e.g. due to a higher proportion of high–skilled workers
at the respective hosting locations). Corporate taxes distorts this optimal location pattern.
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consumer market while the manufacturing of the drugs usually does not yield consid-
erable returns. This provides a strong incentive to fragment the corporate production
process and to locate the highly profitable intangible production assets at countries
with a relatively low tax rate while the low–profit production of the final output good
remains in the (high–tax) consumer markets (see Becker and Fuest, 2007, for a related
theoretical argument). Low relocation costs of intangibles relative to tangible goods
additionally foster this development.
Moreover, profit shifting incentives may strengthen this distortion of intangible asset
holdings towards low–tax locations. Since intangible property owners charge royalty
payments and license fees to operating affiliates worldwide, it enables the MNE to shift
profits between the intermediate holding affiliate and all production locations by dis-
torting the respective intra–firm transfer price. Supporting this line of argumentation,
recent papers relate profit shifting activities to intangible asset ownership (e.g. Grubert,
2003 or Desai et al., 2006) as arm’s length prices for firm–specific intellectual property
rights are hard to determine for tax authorities. The MNE may now optimize its profit
shifting opportunities by choosing the optimal location of intangible assets across af-
filiates. Intuitively, holding intangibles at a low–tax affiliate generates a profit shifting
link between the intangibles–holding tax haven affiliate and all other group members.
Therefore, profit may be shifted from each high–tax affiliate to the intangibles–holding
company in the low–tax country. In contrast, if the intangibles were located at one of
the high–tax affiliates, the MNE would gain only one profit shifting link to the tax
haven affiliate while all other affiliates in high–tax countries would lack shifting oppor-
tunities to a low–tax country. Obviously, this provides an additional incentive to locate
intangible assets at affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate.
Both arguments laid out above suggest that MNEs have an incentive to locate their
intangible property holdings at affiliates with a low corporate tax rate difference to
other group members. The lower a subsidiary’s corporate tax rate relative to other
group affiliates, the larger its attractiveness to become the owner of intangible property
that would otherwise (in the absence of taxation) be located at another group location.
Strictly speaking, the marginal investment decision would depend on the difference in
the effective marginal tax rates between the locations (see Devereux and Griffith, 1998).
For various reasons, we will employ the difference in the statutory corporate tax rates
instead whereas this modification will be discussed in detail in section 4. Moreover, the
incentive to locate intangible assets at low-tax affiliates for the purpose of optimizing
profit shifting strategies is indeed given by the differences between the multinational
affiliates’ statutory corporate tax rates. The larger these differentials the more the MNE
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profits from relocating one unit of earnings from a high–tax to the low–tax affiliate and
consequently the larger the gains from shifting activities.
Following these considerations, MNEs have an incentive to locate intangible property
at affiliates with a small corporate tax rate compared to other group locations which
is in line with recent evidence of multinational intangibles relocations to tax havens.4
3 Data Set
Our empirical analysis employs the commercial database AMADEUS which is com-
piled by Bureau van Dijk. The version of the database available to us contains detailed
information on firm structure and accounting of 1.6 million national and multina-
tional corporations in 38 European countries from 1993 to 2006, but is unbalanced in
structure.5 We focus on the EU–25 and on the time period of 1995–2005 as these coun-
tries and years are sufficiently represented by the database. The observational units
of our analysis are multinational subsidiaries within the EU–25.6 Since our analysis
also requires data on the subsidiary’s parent company (e.g. the number and location of
the parent’s subsidiaries), we investigate only subsidiaries whose parents are likewise
located within the EU–25 and on which information is available in the AMADEUS
database.
Moreover, our analysis accounts only for industrial subsidiaries whose foreign parent
is likewise an industrial corporation and owns at least three subsidiaries (by more
than 90% of the ownership shares). The latter assumption ensures that the MNEs in
4MNEs have several strategies at hand to organize (re)location of intangible property (to) at
low–tax countries. Strategies related to the exploitation of favorable cost–sharing agreements are, for
example, described by Sullivan (2004). Another common strategy is to split up R&D and marketing
departments respectively, in the sense that a (small) fraction of the departments is located at a tax
haven and the rest of the departments remains at a high–tax location. The units located at a low–tax
affiliate then carry out major projects (with high expected returns) and provide service subcontracts
to the R&D and marketing units in the high–tax countries. The latter earn a fixed margin on their
costs while the low–tax affiliate bears the risk of the project and consequently earns all residual profits.
5The AMADEUS database is also widely used outside the scientific community. For example,
tax authorities (e.g. in Germany and France) are known to rely on AMADEUS for their monitoring
activities. The same is true for tax consultanties (e.g. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and KPMG).
6Our criteria of being a multinational enterprise is the existence of a foreign immediate shareholder
(parent) which holds at least 90% of the affiliate’s ownership shares. The data restriction to firms
which are owned by 90% or more ensures that the potential location of profit and intangibles at this
subsidiary is relevant for the multinational group.
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our sample exhibit a sufficient size so that strategical allocation of intangibles may
emerge. In addition, we restrict the sample to multinational groups that actually own
immaterial assets, i.e. either the parent or at least one of its subsidiaries has to hold
intangibles. Last, we drop MNEs which observe a negative profit at all group affiliates
throughout the sample period since they are then not subject to positive tax payments
and profitability and/or profit shifting considerations are henceforth irrelevant.
[Table 1 here]
Our sample contains firms from all EU–25 countries despite Cyprus and Malta. The
country statistics are presented in Table 1. The intangibles measure is the balance sheet
item intangible fixed assets.7 Since many firms in the database report no information on
this variable, our panel data consists of 45,575 observations from 6,732 multinational
subsidiaries for the years 1995–2005. Hence, we observe each affiliate for 6.8 years on
average.
The AMADEUS data has the drawback that information on the ownership structure
is available for the last reported date only which is the year 2004 for most observations
in our sample. Thus, in the context of our panel study, there exists some scope for
misclassifications of parent–subsidiary–connections since the ownership structure may
have changed over the sample period. However, in line with previous studies, we are not
too concerned about this issue since the described misclassifications introduce noise to
our estimations that will bias our results towards zero (see e.g. Budd et al., 2005).
7All balance sheet and profit & loss account items in our analysis are exported from AMADEUS
in unconsolidated values. The balance sheet item intangible asset investments reflects the immaterial
property holdings of an affiliate whereas two cases have to be considered. First, the multinational
affiliate develops the immaterial good on its own. Then, according to all relevant accounting standards,
it is forbidden to capitalize the intangible asset in early development stages. However, in later stages,
e.g. with the application for a patent or an official trademark, the assets are capitalized in the balance
sheet on the basis of the production costs. The second case is that the multinational affiliate purchases
the intangible good from another group affiliate or a third party. Here, the intangible asset is capitalized
in the balance sheet at the purchase value. Since our data does not allow us to distinguish between
own-produced intangible assets and bought intangible property, we can a priori not exclude potential
endogeneity issues here. Nevertheless, since we consider an affiliate’s capacity to produce intangible
property to be determined mainly by time–constant characteristics (e.g. the fraction of high-skilled
workers in the local labor market that is largely invariant over a ten year time period) which are
absorbed by the affiliate fixed effects, we are not too concerned about the issue. Moreover, we will
address this problem in a robustness check, estimating a binary choice model for intangibles holdings
at a certain affiliate which is not prone to capitalization issues.
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[Table 2 here]
Table 2 displays the sample statistics. The mean of the intangible asset variable is
calculated with 3.4 million US dollars at the subsidiary level (however with a large
standard deviation of 117 million) and with 64.8 million at the parent level (again with
a large standard deviation of 785 million). To compare the intangible investment on the
subsidiary and on the parent level in relative terms, we calculate the share of intangible
assets to total assets. The mean of this ratio is about 50% higher for subsidiaries (2.6%)
than for parent firms (1.7%). We moreover define a variable binary intangible assets
which takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary owns intangible assets and 0 otherwise.
The sample average is measured to be 0.5519 and hence 55.2% of the subsidiaries in
our sample hold intangible property. In addition, the affiliates in our data belong to
multinational groups with on average 81.4 subsidiaries that are owned by at least 90%
of the ownership shares. This rather high mean value is thereby driven by a few very
large MNEs, as the median of the subsidiary number distribution is calculated with
26. Furthermore, on average, a subsidiary holds total assets amounting to 105 million
US dollars and observes an operating revenue of 82.2 million.
We additionally merge data on the statutory corporate tax rate at the subsidiary
and parent location, as well as basic country characteristics like GDP per capita (as a
proxy for the degree of development), population (as a proxy for the market size) and
the unemployment rate (as a proxy for the economic situation of a country).8 For the
affiliates in our sample, the statutory corporate tax rate spreads from 10.0% to 56.8%
whereas the mean is calculated with 33.3% on the subsidiary level and with 36.2% on
the parent level. Our theoretical considerations presuppose that the level of intangible
assets may moreover be inversely related to an affiliate’s corporate tax rate relative
to other group members. We therefore define the average tax difference to all other
affiliates which is the unweighted average statutory corporate tax rate difference be-
tween a subsidiary and all other affiliates of the corporate group (including the parent)
that are owned by at least 90% of the ownership shares. This tax difference spreads
from -38.2% to 28.7% with a mean of -0.7%. Although our subsidiary sample comprises
European firms only, the calculation of the average tax difference to all other affiliates
accounts for information on the worldwide structure of the corporate group which is
8The statutory tax rate data for the EU–25 is taken from the European Commission (2006). Our
analysis will moreover rely on tax rates for group affiliates outside the EU as will be explained below.
This data is obtained from KPMG International (2006). Country data for GDP per capita, population
size and unemployment rate are taken from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat).
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generally available with the AMADEUS data. However, for non–European subsidiaries,
this information generally comprises only the subsidiaries’ names, hosting countries and
ownership shares but no accounting information. Therefore, an appropriate weighting
procedure for our tax difference variable is not feasible and we employ an unweighted
average tax measure.9
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 here]
Last, the descriptive statistics strongly confirm the increasing importance of intan-
gible property in corporate production over the last decade. Figures 1 and 2 report the
average level of intangible asset investment at subsidiaries and parents in our sample
between 1995 and 2005. While the average parent firm owns substantially more intan-
gible property than the average subsidiary, the mean value steeply rises for both types
over the years which is in line with previous findings in the literature (e.g. Hall, 2001).
4 Econometric Approach
We employ different methodological approaches to test the hypothesis formulated in
Section 2. The following paragraphs present our baseline estimation model as well as
various robustness checks that account for alternative specifications, endogeneity issues
and a dynamic model of intangible asset investment.
4.1 Baseline Model
In our baseline regression, we estimate an OLS model of the following form
log(yit) = β1 + β2τit + β3Xit + ρt + φi + it (1)
with yit =(intangible assets +1). Since the distribution of intangible asset investment of
subsidiary i at time t is considerably skewed, we employ a logarithmic transformation
9We experimented with size–weighted equivalents of this average tax difference variable. Since the
application of a weighting scheme is only sensible if we observe information on the subsidiaries’ size
variable for all or at least the vast majority of the group affiliates, this leads to a drastic reduction
in sample size as the information on affiliate accounts is often not available for as sufficient number
of group subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we found the application of weighted tax measures to lead to
qualitatively comparable results which are available from the authors upon request.
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of the level of intangible assets as dependent variable. Furthermore, a substantial frac-
tion (44.8%) of the subsidiaries in our dataset does not hold any intangible assets at all
and thus, we follow previous studies (e.g. Plassmann and Tideman, 2001; Alesina et al.,
2002; Hilary and Lennox, 2005; Weichenrieder, 2008) and add a small constant (= 1)
to our intangibles variable to avoid that zero–observations are excluded from the esti-
mation. The explanatory variable of central interest is τit which stands the subsidiary’s
statutory corporate tax rate difference to all other affiliates of the multinational group
(that are owned with at least 90% of the ownership shares) including the parent. One
might also consider to apply the effective marginal tax rate differences to identify the
subsidiary’s marginal intangibles investment (see also Devereux and Griffith, 1998).
However, commonly available effective marginal (and average) tax rates usually refer
to investment projects in the manufacturing industry and do not appropriately reflect
intangibles related investments. Since deductibility rules may substantially differ be-
tween investment forms, we do not consider these effective tax measures to suit well in
our regression context and employ the statutory tax rate as a proxy instead. Given the
commonly reported high correlation between the effective marginal and the statutory
corporate tax rates, we consider this approach to be valid.10 Moreover, as suggested
by Section 2, the statutory corporate tax rate difference simultaneously captures the
incentive to locate intangible property at low–tax countries for profit shifting purposes.
Furthermore, Xit comprises a vector of time–varying country control characteristics
like GDP per capita, population size and the unemployment rate. These macro controls
are included to ensure that the results are not driven by an unobserved correlation be-
tween a country’s wealth, market size and economic situation (as proxied by the above
variables) with corporate taxes and intangible investment. The variables will enter in
logarithmic form although this is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively decisive for
our results. Furthermore, a full set of year dummies ρt is included to capture shocks
over time common to all subsidiaries. it describes the error term. Since we apply panel
data, we are able to add subsidiary fixed effects to control for non–observable, time–
constant firm–specific characteristics φi. Using fixed–effects is reasonable and necessary
in our analysis since a firm’s level of intangible assets is likely to be driven by internal
firm–specific factors which are impossible to be captured by observable control variables
available in our data set. The fixed–effects model is also preferred to a random–effects
approach by a Hausman–Test.
Starting from this baseline approach, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to
10Nevertheless, we experimented with effective marginal corporate taxes and found qualitatively
comparable effects on intangible asset investment.
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alternative model specifications.
4.2 Robustness Check I: Binary Dependent Variable
In a first sensitivity check, we take into account that 44.8% of the subsidiaries in
our data do not exhibit any intangible property holdings at all. This data structure
indicates it to be a relevant multinational choice whether or not to locate intangible
property at an affiliate at all and that a binary choice model might fit the data well.
Thus, the sensitivity check comprises a model of the following form
bit = γ1 + γ2τit + γ3Xit + ρt + φi + vit (2)
whereas bit represents the binary intangible assets variable that takes on the value
1 if a subsidiary owns intangible property and the value 0 otherwise. The explana-
tory variables are specified analogously to equation (1). Again the regression includes
time–constant affiliate fixed effects and year dummies. In a first step, we determine
the coefficient estimates for equation (2) based on maximum–likelihood techniques by
estimating a fixed–effect logit model. The model thereby critically relies on the as-
sumption that the error term vit follows a logistic distribution. As an additional check
to our results, we thus reestimate equation (2) in a linear probability framework based
on the standard OLS assumptions.11
4.3 Robustness Check II: Size Control
In a second sensitivity check, we extend our baseline estimation and additionally con-
trol for affiliate size. Conditioning intangible asset investments on affiliate size may
be decisive since otherwise our tax measure might reflect the widely–tested negative
impact of corporate taxation on subsidiary size only. It is well–known that low cor-
porate tax rates foster affiliate investment and vice versa. If large affiliates also tend
to hold high investments in intangible property, the corporate tax effect determined
in our baseline estimation may be contaminated by the underlying negative relation
between corporate taxes and affiliate size.
11The data structure suggests the estimation of a truncated regression model. However, truncated
models like tobit are not feasible with affiliate fixed effects. Since subsidiary fixed effect turn out to
be decisive in our empirical analysis, we consider the application of a binary fixed–effect logit and an
OLS model respectively to be an appropriate alternative.
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To circumvent this issue, we include the subsidiary’s total capital investment as con-
trol variable.12 This may, however, give rise to obvious reverse causality problems since
intangible assets may well determine an affiliate’s volume of total capital investment.
We therefore employ the levels estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) which
suggests to control for time constant affiliate effects by taking the first differences of
the estimation equation and to instrument for the difference in the endogenous vari-
able (here: total assets) by employing lagged levels of this variable.13 Thus, we use a
two–stage instrumental variables approach (2SLS) to estimate the following model
∆ log(yit) = β2∆τit + β3∆Xit + β4∆log(ait) + ∆ρt +∆it (3)
whereas yit, τit, Xit and it correspond to the variables defined in Section 4.1 and ait
stands for the total asset investment of subsidiary i at time t. Moreover, ∆ indicates the
first difference operator. Our result tables will report the F–statistic for the relevance
of the instruments at the first stage of the regression model and a Sargan/Hansen–Test
of overidentifying restrictions which tests for the validity of the instruments employed,
i.e. for their exogeneity with respect to the error term ∆it.
4.4 Robustness Check III: Dynamic Model
Last, our estimation approach so far did not take into account that relocating intangible
property within the MNE might be associated with considerable positive adjustment
costs. For example, relocating corporate R&D units and/or the associated patent rights
from one affiliate to another is associated with a move of workers and tangible assets
and henceforth implies relocation costs. Thus, we expect a subsidiary’s intangibles
holdings in previous periods to be a predictor for intangible assets investment today
and include the first lag of a subsidiary’s intangible asset investment yi,t−1 as additional
explanatory variable in our estimation equation.
The well–known dynamic panel bias implies that including the first lag of the de-
pendent variable as additional control in a fixed–effects framework leads to biased
12Our results are robust against the use of alternative proxies for subsidiary size, e.g. the subsidiaries’
operating revenue.
13With panel data on more than two time periods, it is not equivalent to apply a fixed–effect and
first–differencing approach respectively. Both models give unbiased and consistent estimates although
the relative efficiency of the estimators may differ, depending on the model structure. Precisely, the
fixed–effect estimator is less sensitive against the violation of strict exogeneity of the regressors while
the first–differencing estimator is less sensitive against the violation of serially uncorrelated error terms.
In the result section, we will discuss the relation between the fixed–effects and first–differencing results.
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coefficient estimates because the lagged dependent variable is endogenous to the fixed
effects in the error term. Thus, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) who build on the
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) framework applied in section 4.3 and suggest to estimate
a first–difference generalized method of moments (GMM) model and instrument for
the first difference in the lagged dependent variable by deeper lags of the level of the
dependent variable.14 The estimation equation then takes on the following form
∆ log(yit) = β1∆ log(yi,t−1) + β2∆τit + β3∆Xit + β4∆log(ait) + ∆ρt +∆it. (4)
The variable definitions correspond to the ones in previous sections. Because the model
is estimated in first–differences, the equation will be characterized by the presence of
first–order serial correlation. However, the validity of the GMM estimator relies on the
absence of second–order serial correlation. The Arellano/Bond–Test for second–order
serial correlation will be reported at the bottom of the result table. Again, we check
for the exogeneity of the instrument set by employing a Sargan/Hansen–Test.
5 Empirical Results
This section presents our empirical results. Throughout all regressions, the observa-
tional units of our analysis are the multinational subsidiaries as explained in sections
3 and 4. Additionally, in all upcoming estimations, a full set of year dummy variables
is included and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters are
calculated and displayed in the tables in parentheses. Section 5.1 presents the baseline
findings while section 5.2 displays the results of our robustness checks.
5.1 Baseline Estimation
Table 3 presents our baseline estimation. Following the methodology described in sec-
tion 4.2, specification (1) regresses the logarithm of subsidiary intangible asset invest-
ment on the firm’s statutory corporate tax rate, while controlling for fixed firm and
year effects. In line with our theoretical considerations, we find a statistically significant
negative influence that suggests high corporate tax rates at an affiliate to be associated
with low intangible asset investment and vice versa. The effect is robust against the
inclusion of time–varying country control characteristics in specification (2).
14Note that the difference in the lagged dependent variable correlates with the differenced error
term. However, deeper lags (starting from the second lag) of the dependent variable (in levels) are
available as valid instruments as they are orthogonal to the error term.
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[Table 3 here]
However, the subsidiaries’ statutory tax rate may be an imprecise measure for tax
incentives on intangible asset location since our hypothesis predicts intangibles to be
located in countries with a low tax rate relative to all other affiliates of the corporate
group. This is accounted for in specifications (3) and (4) which regress the level of
intangible assets on the average tax difference to all other affiliates. Confirming our
theoretical expectations of Section 2, the results indicate that the average statutory
corporate tax rate difference between a subsidiary and other group members exerts a
highly significant negative impact on the subsidiary’s intangibles holdings. Quantita-
tively, the estimations suggest that a decrease in the average tax difference to all other
affiliates by 1 percentage point raises the subsidiary’s level of intangible assets by 1.6%
(cf. column (4)).
5.2 Robustness Checks
In the following, we will determine the robustness of our results to alternative model
specifications as laid out in subsections 4.2 – 4.4 on the econometric methodology.
5.2.1 Binary Dependent Variable
In a first step, we estimate equation (2) and thus focus on the binary multinational
choice whether to locate intangible property at a certain affiliate or not. The results are
displayed in Table 4. Specifications (1) and (2) thereby present maximum–likelihood
estimations of a fixed–effect logit model. The dependent variable is the binary intangible
assets measure defined above. Since the logit estimation controls for subsidiary fixed
effects, many subsidiaries drop out of the estimation since they observe no variation
in the status of intangibles–holding vs. non–holding during the observation period.
Nevertheless, the estimations still comprises an adequate number of about 2, 200 firms
for which information is available for 7.5 years on average.
[Table 4 here]
In specification (1), we regress the binary variable on the subsidiary’s statutory tax
rate. The coefficient estimate is negative and highly significant and thus confirms the
presumption that a subsidiary’s probability of holding intangible property decreases
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in the location’s statutory tax rate. Moreover, specification (2) estimates the relation
using the average tax difference to all other affiliates as explanatory tax variable. Again,
we find a negative effect on intangibles holdings which is statistically significant at the
5% level. Thus, the lower a subsidiary’s statutory corporate tax rate compared to all
other affiliates of the same multinational group (including the parent), the higher is its
probability of holding intangible assets.15
Nevertheless, the estimation of the fixed–effect logit model critically depends on the
assumption of a logistic distribution of the error term. Thus, as a sensitivity check,
we moreover estimate a linear probability model with subsidiary fixed effects. The
application of an OLS framework thereby has the additional advantage that we make
use of all information in our dataset and do not preclude the sample to subsidiaries
which observe a change over the sample period in the status of intangibles–holding
vs. non–holding. The results are displayed in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 4 and
are qualitatively equal to the results of the logit model. Ceteris paribus, a reduction
of the unweighted average tax difference to all other affiliates by 10 percentage points
is suggested to rise the subsidiary’s probability of holding intangible assets by 1.97
percentage points on average (cf. column (4)). As the mean probability of holding
intangibles is 55.2%, this corresponds to an average increase of 3.6%.
5.2.2 Control for Subsidiary Size
As a second robustness check, we will determine whether our estimated corporate tax
effect on intangible asset investment is robust against the inclusion of a control variable
for subsidiary size. Precisely, we will condition the intangible property holdings on
the subsidiary’s total capital investment. To account for potential reverse causality
with respect to total and intangible investment levels as described in section 4.3, we
estimate the equation in first differences and employ the lagged levels of total assets
as instruments for the first differences in total assets (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).
To do so, we first compare the coefficient estimates from a first–differencing approach
to the fixed–effects model and reestimate specifications (2) and (4) of Table 3 using
first differences instead of fixed effects. The results are displayed in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 5. While the qualitative effect of both, the statutory tax rate and the
average tax difference to all other affiliates, on the level of intangible asset investment
15The coefficient estimates of a logit estimation cannot be interpreted quantitatively. Moreover,
applying a logit model with fixed effects makes the calculation of marginal effects impracticable as it
requires specifying a distribution for the fixed effects.
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remains unchanged, the point estimates are substantially smaller than for the fixed–
effect regressions (−1.17 and −0.92, respectively) although they do not statistically
differ from each other. Since we consider unobserved heterogeneity in the subsidiary
characteristics to be a major issue in our regression context, we generally presume
the fixed–effects approach to deliver the more efficient estimates. Nevertheless, since
the qualitative results are independent of the model employed and first–differencing
delivers smaller coefficient estimates than the fixed–effect approach, we feel confident
that a qualitative and a quantitative interpretation of the first–differencing model’s
coefficient estimates (as a lower bound) is valid.
[Table 5 here]
In specifications (3) and (4), we add the level of a subsidiary’s total assets as size
control whereas we treat the variable as exogenous with respect to the error term. The
inclusion of this additional control does not alter the coefficient estimates of our tax
variables by much. The coefficient estimate of total assets is positive and statistically
significant suggesting that larger affiliates tend to hold more intangible property. How-
ever, since the specifications do not control for potential reverse causality, the coefficient
estimates may be biased.
In specifications (5) and (6), we address this endogeneity problem and instrument
the first difference of total assets with lagged levels of the variable.16 This modification
of the estimation model slightly increases the coefficient estimates of our tax measures
which remain statistically significant. Interestingly though, instrumenting for total as-
set investments erases the positive effect of affiliate size on intangible asset holdings
now suggesting that intangible asset investment is independent of affiliate size. More-
over, the usual test statistics claim our specification to be valid since the F–test for
the instruments at the first stage is highly significant indicating our instruments to
be relevant. Furthermore, the null–hypothesis of the Sargan/Hansen–Test is accepted
stating that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and henceforth valid.
16Precisely, we employ the second to fourth lag of the logarithm of total asset investment as in-
struments. We consider this to be an appropriate model specification since with the Anderson and
Hsiao (1982) estimator, the gained information from including additional lags as instruments has to
be weighted against the loss in sample size due to missing values implied by including additional lags.
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5.2.3 Dynamic Estimation
As a third sensitivity check, we determine the relation between corporate taxes and
intangible asset investment in a dynamic model which additionally accounts for pos-
itive adjustment and relocation costs of intangible property. We follow Arellano and
Bond (1991) and employ a one–step linear GMM estimator in first differences which
implies that the endogenous differenced lag of intangible assets investments is instru-
mented with the second and all deeper lags of the level of intangible asset investments
as explained in section 4.4.17 The results are presented in Table 6 and point to a dy-
namic nature of intangible asset investment since lagged intangible property holdings
indeed show a significant and quantitatively relevant impact on current intangibles
investments.
[Table 6 here]
Our corporate tax effects on intangible asset investment are largely unaffected by
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and quantitatively correspond to the
estimations in the non–dynamic case presented in Table 5. Specifications (1) and (2)
of Table 6 document a negative and significant effect of the subsidiary’s statutory tax
rate and the tax difference variable on intangible asset investment. In specifications
(3) and (4), we again include subsidiary total asset investment as size control whereas
we treat the variable as endogenous and instrument it with the second and all deeper
lags of its level. The results show a similar picture as the previous subsection. While
the coefficient estimates for the corporate tax measures are unaffected by the inclusion
of the size control and remain statistically significant and of quantitatively relevant
size, the total asset variable itself does not exert any statistically significant effect on
intangible asset holdings. Finally, in specifications (5) and (6), we additionally include
the second lag of the intangible asset variable to control for a deeper dynamic effect.
This second lag shows no significant effect on intangible investment and does not affect
17Note that with the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, we do not face the trade–off of the
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator that the gained information from including additional lags as
instruments has to be weighted against the loss in sample size due to missing values. This applies since
the Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology sets missing values to 0 and still derives a meaningful set
of moments conditions. Nevertheless, we additionally reestimated all specifications of Table 6 in an
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) framework and found qualitative and quantitative comparable results.
Here, the F–statistic of the first–stage regression also indicates a strong relevance of the instrument
set used.
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our qualitative tax result. Moreover, the test statistics confirm our dynamic specifica-
tions to be valid. The Arellano/Bond–Test accepts the null–hypothesis that there is no
second–order autocorrelation in the error term and likewise the Sargan/Hansen–Test
of overidentifying restrictions accepts the null–hypothesis that the set of instruments
is exogenous to the error term.
5.2.4 Other Robustness Checks
Furthermore, we rerun all our specifications with the additional inclusion of a full
set of 110 one–digit NACE code industry–year dummies (not reported). This add–
on does not change any of our qualitative and quantitative results. In addition, we
checked if our results are driven by a pure Eastern European effect. We thus defined
a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary is located in one of the
Eastern European countries (comprising the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and generated interaction terms of the East
European dummy with the set of year effects. Including these in our regression analysis
does not alter any of the qualitative and quantitative results.
Finally, we reestimate our regressions employing the statutory corporate tax rate
difference between a subsidiary and its parent firm as explanatory variable (instead of
the average tax difference to all other group affiliates, including the parent). This model
specification accounts for the fact that a large fraction of intangible property is tradi-
tionally held by the multinational parent firms (see Figures 1 and 2) and parents are
perceived to be the natural and classic owners and administrators of intangible prop-
erty since they host the MNEs’ relevant management and administration departments.
Regressing intangible asset investment on the tax difference to the parent captures the
incentive to relocate intangibles from the parent to the considered subsidiary for tax
purposes. We hence reestimate all specifications presented in this paper (including the
robustness checks) using the tax difference to the parent as the relevant tax measure.
This modification leads to the same qualitative results (not reported) as the models
accounting for the tax structure of the whole MNE and supports the notion that taxes
impact on the location of intangibles within an MNE.18
Summing up, we present empirical evidence that the lower the corporate tax rate of
a subsidiary relative to all other affiliates of the multinational group the higher is its
level of intangible assets. This result turns out to be robust against a set of sensitivity
checks and specifications.
18The results are available from the authors upon request.
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5.3 Corporate Tax Differentials and Affiliate Profitability
The previous subsections presented evidence that intangible assets are distorted to-
wards affiliates with a low corporate tax rate. Our theoretical motivation predicts that
this distortion may root firstly in the incentive to locate highly profitable immaterial
goods at countries with a relatively low corporate tax rate and, secondly, in the incen-
tive to optimize intra–group profit shifting opportunities. Both explanations imply that
the profitability observed at multinational low–tax affiliates exceeds the profitability at
high–tax affiliates, either because value–driving assets are located at low–tax countries
or because intangible property is used to shift profits there.
This predicted pattern is very much in line with evidence found in the extensive em-
pirical literature on profit shifting. Several papers show an inverse relation between cor-
porate taxes and affiliate profitability. For example, Collins et al. (1998) and Dischinger
(2007) present evidence that the statutory corporate tax difference between a subsidiary
and its parent firm negatively affects the subsidiary’s productivity (measured as pre–
tax profit per units of input factors). Analogously, Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga
and Laeven (2008) and an earlier discussion paper version of our paper (Dischinger
and Riedel, 2008) provide evidence that affiliate productivity falls in the average tax
difference to all other affiliates of the multinational group. These results are usually
interpreted as indirect evidence for profit shifting activities. Our paper suggests an
alternative motivation for the observed profitability pattern. We argue that it may,
apart from profit shifting activities, equally be caused by the location of profit–driving
intangible assets at low–tax countries.
A rigorous test of this presumption implies to show that the dependency between
the corporate tax rate distribution across affiliates and the profitability pattern is more
extreme in MNEs that observe a large share of their intangible asset holdings at affiliates
with a relatively low corporate tax rate; i.e., profit (per unit of input factors and sales
respectively) earned at low–tax affiliates is larger and profit earned at high–tax affiliates
is correspondingly lower than in the absence of an intangible investment bias towards
low–tax countries. However, this task is complicated and goes beyond the scope of our
paper. A main issue here is that we do not observe detailed accounting data on the
whole multinational group (see also section 3 on data) and henceforth cannot clearly
determine the intangible asset distribution across the MNE. Moreover, the location of
intangible property within a multinational firm is endogeneous and may be determined
by unobserved factors that equally impact on affiliate profitability. We address this
question in a companion paper (Dischinger and Riedel, 2008b) where we exploit the fact
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that the major fraction of intangible assets is still held by the parent firm (see Figures
1 and 2).19 Headquarters are moreover largely immobile in an international context
and usually remain in the country where the corporation was originally founded. Thus,
the parent location may be considered to be exogenous. In line with our theoretical
presumptions, the companion paper finds that profitability differences between high–
tax and low–tax affiliates are significantly larger if the multinational headquarters,
and thus a high fraction of profit–driving and shifting–relevant assets, are located in a
low–tax country.
6 Conclusions
The last years have witnessed an increasing importance of intangible assets (patents,
copyrights, brand names, etc.) in the corporate production process of MNEs (see Fig-
ures 1 and 2). Anecdotal evidence thereby suggests that these intangibles are often
located at low–tax affiliates. For example, Nestle, Vodafone and British American
Tabacco have created brand management units in countries with a relatively low cor-
porate tax rate that charge royalties to operating subsidiaries worldwide. Our paper
argues that these relocation tendencies are driven by two motivations. Firstly, by the
incentive to save taxes through the relocation of highly profitable intangible assets
to low–tax countries. Secondly, by the incentive to optimize profit shifting strategies
through the distortion of transfer prices for intangible property traded within the firm.
Intangibles are usually firm–specific goods for which arm’s length prices can hardly be
determined by tax authorities. Henceforth, MNEs may overstate the transfer price for
the intermediate immaterial good at relatively low expected costs and thus shift profits
from high–tax production affiliates to the intangibles–holding affiliate in the low–tax
country.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the first systematic empirical
evidence that the location of intangible assets within MNEs is indeed distorted towards
low–tax affiliates. Based on a rich data set of European MNEs during the years 1995 to
2005, we show that the lower the statutory corporate tax rate of a subsidiary relative
to all other affiliates of the multinational group, the higher is the level of intangible
assets at this location. This result turns out to be robust against various specifications
19The headquarters location usually hosts the MNE’s central management. That most of the intan-
gible property is still located with the MNE’s central management, could be justified by the manage-
ment’s desire to have the decisive intangible assets under their direct control.
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and robustness checks. Thus, the evidence suggests that MNEs exploit the enhanced
importance of intellectual property in the production process by distorting its location
within the corporate group to minimize their overall tax liabilities. Quantitatively,
we find a semi–elasticity of around 1.1, meaning that a decrease in the average tax
difference to all other group affiliates by 10 percentage points raises a subsidiary’s
stock of intangibles by around 11% on average.
These behavioral adjustments have profound consequences for international corpo-
rate tax competition. First, the relocation of intangible assets to tax havens facilitates
income shifting and enlarges the streams of multinational profit transferred to countries
with a low tax rate. This increases the governmental incentive to lower its corporate
tax rate and aggravates the race–to–the–bottom in corporate taxes. Second, it is im-
portant to stress that the creation and administration of intangible assets is related
to real corporate activity. To relocate patents and trademark rights to low–tax coun-
tries, MNEs have to transfer part of their R&D departments and their administration
and marketing units with them. Obviously, these multinational service units comprise
high–skilled workers who represent part of the decisive corporate human capital (see
e.g. Bresnahan et al., 2002). Thus, countries which attract intangible investment by
lowering their corporate tax rate do not only gain higher pre–tax profits but may also
win additional jobs and knowledge capital that may spill over and increase the produc-
tivity of local firms. According to this, the gains from lowering the corporate tax rate
surge along a second line and enforce tax competition behavior.
Currently, the regulations on intangibles relocation within MNEs are rather lax in
many OECD countries. For example, rules with respect to cost sharing agreements
between multinational affiliates are loose in the US and other OECD countries (see
also Grubert and Mutti, 2007) and thus tend to foster the shift of patent rights from
parent R&D departments to R&D units at low–tax affiliates. Additionally, in most
OECD countries (part of) the intangible property can be relocated across borders at
rather low costs. For example, if an MNE moves a production center from a high–tax
country to a tax–haven, it usually has to calculate transfer prices for all tangible assets
transferred while intangible goods like e.g. production plans and knowledge capital is
not accounted for.
Many governments have identified these hidden intangible asset relocations from their
countries as one major source of corporate tax revenue losses. For example, Germany
has recently come forward with an unilateral attempt to restrict the relocation of
(intellectual property owning) production units from its borders. In January 2008,
a new legislation was introduced that regulates transfer prices to be charged on the
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whole relocated multinational affiliate. This implies that MNEs must calculate transfer
prices not only on their tangible production units but equally have to account for the
intangible value, the profit potential, of the firm. Other countries are expected to follow
the German advance with the introduction of similar regulations. In the light of our
paper, this tightening on relocation possibilities of intangible assets across borders
should be appreciated as it reduces the potential for tax competition behavior.
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7 Appendix
Figure 1: Parent Level Intangible Assets over Time
(Mean of all observations per year, in thousand US dollars, current prices)
Figure 2: Subsidiary Level Intangible Assets over Time
(Mean of all observations per year, in thousand US dollars, current prices)
24
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Subsidiaries
Austria 86
Belgium 462
Czech Republic 214
Denmark 409
Estonia 123
Finland 307
France 809
Germany 309
Great Britain 949
Greece 60
Hungary 97
Ireland 107
Italy 492
Latvia 54
Lithuania 33
Luxembourg 31
Netherlands 530
Poland 391
Portugal 105
Slovakia 45
Slovenia 7
Spain 665
Sweden 447
Sum 6,732
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Subsidiary Level:
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 45,575 .3333 .0632 .1 .5676
Avg. Tax Diff. to All Other Aff.N 43,813 -.0070 .0634 -.3817 .2865
Intangible AssetsF 45,575 3,420 116,636 0 1.03e+07
Binary Intangible Assets 45,575 .5519 .4973 0 1
Total AssetsF 45,575 105,206 900,066 2 7.75e+07
Operating RevenueF 44,583 82,179 439,198 0 2.25e+07
Ratio Intangible to Total Assets 45,575 .0262 .0841 0 1
Parent Level:
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 45,575 .3624 .0725 .1 .5676
Intangible AssetsF 36,223 64,845 784,666 0 1.98e+07
Number of Subsidiaries 45,575 81.4 135.6 3 752
Ratio Intangible to Total Assets 36,223 .0173 .0546 0 .9924
Country Level:
GDP per Capita (in Euro) 45,575 21,877 8,333 1,517 60,311
Population (per thousand) 45,575 34,588 24,274 406 82,537
Unemployment Rate 45,217 .0863 .0365 .021 .199
Notes:
N The Average Tax Difference to All Other Affiliates is calculated as: statutory corporate
tax rate of the considered subsidiary minus the unweighted average statutory corporate tax
rate of all other group members, comprising subsidiaries (owned with at least 90% of the
ownership shares) and the parent firm.
F In thousands of US dollars, current prices.
 Binary Intangible Assets takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary owns intangible assets and
takes on the value 0 if a subsidiary does not own any intangibles.
 Subsidiaries owned with ≥ 90% of the ownership shares. Median is calculated with 26.
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Table 3: Baseline Estimation: Subsidiary’s Level of Intangibles
OLS Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Intangible Assets
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Statutory Tax Rate -2.440∗∗∗ -1.968∗∗∗
(.6366) (.6635)
Avg. Tax Difference to All Other Affiliates -2.041∗∗∗ -1.598∗∗∗
(.5638) (.5804)
Log GDP per Capita -.2115 -.2167
(.2178) (.2240)
Log Population -2.446 -3.006∗
(1.592) (1.617)
Log Unemployment Rate .1238 .1227
(.0906) (.0934)
Number of Observations 45,575 45,217 43,813 43,467
Number of Firms 6,732 6,732 6,473 6,473
Adjusted R2 .7627 .7638 .7618 .7630
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multi-
national subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership
shares. Additionally, to be included in the estimation, at least one affiliate of a corporate
group has to own intangible assets and at least one has to make positive profits. The de-
pendent variable is the natural logarithm (log) of the level of intangible assets; we add a
small constant to the initial level to avoid losing observations with zero intangibles by taking
the logarithm. An OLS model with fixed firm effects is estimated. The variable Average Tax
Difference to All Other Affiliates is defined as the unweighted average statutory tax rate
difference between the considered subsidiary and all other affiliates of the corporate group
including the parent. All regressions include year dummy variables. Adjusted R2 values are
calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 4: Robustness Check I: Binary Dependent Variable
Logit & OLS Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Binary Intangible Assets
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Statutory Tax Rate -3.935∗∗∗ -.3352∗∗∗
(1.126) (.1035)
Avg. Tax Difference to All Other Affiliates -2.557∗∗ -.1972∗∗
(1.083) (.1010)
GDP per Capita 1.868 3.907∗∗ -.0008 .1581
(1.917) (1.904) (.1347) (.1315)
Population -22.31∗∗∗ -21.34∗∗∗ -1.580∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗
(7.321) (7.464) (.6186) (.6358)
Unemployment Rate -.0452 1.266 -.1267 -.0176
(2.568) (2.577) (.1782) (.1811)
Number of Observations 16,817 16,245 45,198 43,448
Number of Firms 2,254 2,178 6,732 6,473
Model Logit FE Logit FE OLS FE OLS FE
Pseudo R2 (Logit), Adjusted R2 (OLS) .0233 .0229 .7224 .7209
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multi-
national subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership
shares. Additionally, to be included in the estimation, at least one affiliate of the corporate
group has to own intangible assets and at least one has to make positive profits. The depen-
dent binary variable is set to 1 if a subsidiary owns intangible assets and is 0 if not. In (1)
– (2), a logit model with fixed firm effects (FE) is estimated while in (3) – (4) a linear OLS
model with fixed firm effects is applied. The variable Average Tax Difference to All Other
Affiliates is defined as the unweighted average statutory tax rate difference between the con-
sidered subsidiary and all other affiliates of the corporate group including the parent. All
regressions include year dummy variables. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy
variables regression equivalent to the fixed–effects model.
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Table 5: Robustness Check II: Control for Subsidiary Size
OLS & IV First Differences, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Intangible Assets
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.166∗∗∗ -1.044∗∗ -1.845∗∗
(.4393) (.8993)
Avg. Tax Difference to -.9235∗∗ -.8164∗∗ -1.292∗
All Other Affiliates (.4006) (.3976) (.7648)
Log GDP per Capita .3442∗∗ .3620∗∗ -.0308 -.0131 .2658 .2741
(.1689) (.1729) (.1678) (.1717) (.3125) (.3215)
Log Population -1.311 -1.639 -1.341 -1.497 -3.709∗ -4.637∗∗
(1.527) (1.540) (1.459) (1.473) (1.946) (1.966)
Log Unemployment Rate .2004∗∗ .2047∗∗ .1955∗∗ .2011∗∗ .1363 .1383
(.0826) (.0839) (.0812) (.0825) (.1175) (.1192)
Log Total Assets .5056∗∗∗ .5052∗∗∗ -.0441 -.0388
(.0299) (.0305) (.1841) (.1876)
Number of Observations 37,242 35,800 37,214 35,773 19,436 18,659
Number of Firms 6,498 6,251 6,498 6,251 4,881 4,693
Model OLS FD OLS FD OLS FD OLS FD IV FD IV FD
1st–stage F–Test of excl. 48.54 46.13
instruments (F–statistic)
Hansen J–Test (P–value) .3461 .1836
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multi-
national subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at least 90% of the ownership
shares. Additionally, to be included in the estimation, at least one affiliate of the corporate
group has to own intangible assets and at least one has to make positive profits. The depen-
dent variable is the natural logarithm (log) of the level of intangible assets; we add a small
constant to the initial level to avoid losing observations with zero intangibles by taking the
logarithm. In (1) – (4), an OLS model in first differences (FD) with no constant is estimated.
In (5) – (6), a first–differenced instrumental variables (IV) approach in two stages (2SLS)
with no constant is applied, with the 1st difference of Log Total Assets being instrumented
with the 2nd – 4th lag of the level of Log Total Assets (cf. Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). The
variable Average Tax Difference to All Other Affiliates is defined as the unweighted average
statutory tax rate difference between the considered subsidiary and all other affiliates of the
corporate group including the parent. All regressions include year dummy variables. Note,
time–constant heterogeneity between subsidiaries is controlled for by first–differencing.
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Table 6: Robustness Check III: Dynamic Estimation
Difference GMM, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Intangible Assets
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Lag of Log Intang. Ass. .8515∗∗∗ .8519∗∗∗ .8421∗∗∗ .8423∗∗∗ .8351∗∗∗ .8288∗∗∗
(.0241) (.0246) (.0217) (.0222) (.0255) (.0260)
2nd Lag of Log Intang. Ass. .0018 .0035
(.0133) (.0135)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.349∗∗ -1.300∗∗ -1.711∗∗
(.5976) (.6018) (.8077)
Avg. Tax Difference to -1.123∗∗ -1.125∗∗ -1.237∗
All Other Affiliates (.5802) (.5769) (.7191)
Log GDP per Capita .0607 .1905 -.0394 .0872 .0795 .1195
(.1541) (.1428) (.2036) (.2062) (.3304) (.3398)
Log Population -2.284∗ -2.182∗ -2.354∗ -2.226∗ -1.655 -1.785
(1.280) (1.333) (1.238) (1.291) (1.529) (1.538)
Log Unemployment Rate .1899∗ .1892∗ .1827∗ .1805∗ .1896 .1879
(.1060) (.1071) (.1049) (.1060) (.1202) (.1225)
Log Total Assets .0582 .0534 -.0241 -.0297
(.0962) (.0986) (.1257) (.1301)
Number of Observations 30,164 28,984 30,148 28,969 24,046 23,095
Number of Firms 5,893 5,671 5,890 5,668 5,357 5,155
Number of Instruments 22 22 31 31 30 30
Arellano–Bond–Test for .356 .296 .349 .290 .887 .805
AR(2) (P–value)
Hansen–Test (P–value) .432 .501 .459 .441 .243 .242
Notes: Standard errors robust against heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within firms
are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The
observational units are multinational subsidiaries that exhibit a foreign parent which owns at
least 90% of the ownership shares. Additionally, to be included in the estimation, at least one
affiliate of the corporate group has to own intangibles and at least one has to make positive
profits. The dependent variable is the logarithm (log) of the level of intangible assets; we
add a small constant to the initial level to avoid losing observations with zero intangibles
by taking the logarithm. A one–step linear GMM dynamic panel–data estimation in first
differences with no constant is applied. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we instrument
the 1st difference of the 1st Lag of Log Intangible Assets with the 2nd and all deeper lags of
the level of Log Intangible Assets. In (3) – (6), we additionally instrument the 1st difference
of Log Total Assets with the 2nd and all deeper lags of Log Total Assets levels. The variable
Average Tax Difference to All Other Affiliates is defined as the unweighted average statutory
tax rate difference between the considered subsidiary and all other affiliates of the corporate
group including the parent. All regressions include year dummy variables. Note, time–constant
heterogeneity between subsidiaries is controlled for by first–differencing.
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